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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
People ex rel. Gordon v. O'Flynn'
(decided April 21, 2004)
Tyrone Gordon petitioned the court for a writ of habeas
corpus to suppress evidence in parole revocation proceedings.
During a hearing, held after his preliminary parole revocation
proceeding, Gordon contended that the evidence submitted to the
parole board was obtained through an illegal search and seizure, in
violation of his federal and state constitutional rights.

Petitioner

based his challenge on the long held view in New York "that the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies in parole revocation
proceedings."'3 However, the United States Supreme Court has
held that the exclusionary rule generally applies only to criminal
prosecutions, not to state parole revocation proceedings.'

The

court was confronted with determining which constitution should

l775 N.Y.S.2d 507 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:

2

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12 provides, in pertinent part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
3 Gordon, 775 N.Y.S.2d at 508 (citing People ex rel. Piccarillo v. New York
State Bd. of Parole, 397 N.E.2d 354 (N.Y. 1979)).
4 Id. (citing Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998)).
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apply, and further, whether the exclusionary rule applied by federal
courts only to criminal proceedings takes precedence over its
expansive treatment by New York courts.'

The court determined

that the federal decision governs6 and denied Gordon's petition.
During the late evening hours of September 25, 2003,
Tyrone Gordon was spotted by a law enforcement officer in a high
crime area of the City of Rochester.7 The police officer observed
Gordon burying a plastic bag and later retrieving the bag before
riding off on his bicycle.' The officer observed no other suspicious
conduct but believed that the behavior involving the plastic bag
was consistent with criminal drug activity.9 Upon this basis, he
radioed for several units to stop Gordon.

°

One of several squad

cars responding to the call pursued Gordon whose conduct seemed
quite ordinary and required only that the police continue
observation."

Yet pursuit ensued and concluded with Gordon

discarding the plastic bag. 12 At no time did any of the officers see
the contents of the plastic bag, which was later found to contain
cocaine.

3

Gordon brought a habeas corpus petition seeking to

suppress the evidence submitted to the parole board. 4

5 Id. at

509.

61d.
7id.
8

Gordon, 775 N.Y.S.2d at 509.

9Id.
1o Id.
"2 Id. at 510.
' 1d
13 Gordon, 775 N.Y.S.2d
at 509.
4

1 Id. at 508.
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Gordon's state constitutional right to be free from pursuit
without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity was violated. 5
Police suspicions were unfounded and required only a verbal
inquiry into Gordon's conduct.16

"Yet the police activity . .

involved pursuit of petitioner, using a squad car to drive into the
park area, and use of the spotlight and an order to defendant, who
was on his bicycle, to effectively 'pull-over.' "'v Until there were
sufficient indications of criminal activity, Gordon had a right to
continue riding his bicycle

8

and under the New York State

Constitution, he retained the right not to respond, or to remain
silent, 9 to any police inquiries.

Once the court concluded that

Gordon's state constitutional rights were violated, it analyzed the
exclusionary rule as applied to administrative proceedings under
the federal and New York state constitutions.
In United States v. Calandra, the United States Supreme
Court decided "whether a witness summoned to appear and testify
before a grand jury may refuse to answer questions on the ground
that they are based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search
'
and seizure. "20
The Court held that a grand jury proceeding is "an

"6 Id. at 511.
1 1d.

17 1d

Gordon, 775 N.Y.S.2d at 511.
'gN.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 states, in pertinent part: "nor shall he or she be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself or herself ..."
20 414 U.S. 338, 339 (1974). Federal agents searched the defendant's
place of
business using a warrant issued upon suspicion of illegal gambling operations,
but later found to be invalid. Id.at 340. They seized a card implicating
loansharking activities. Id.at 341. Subpoened by a special grand jury, Calandra
refused to testify and moved to suppress the evidence. Id.The Sixth Circuit
affirmed the lower court's ruling that the exclusionary rule could bar
18
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ex parte investigation to determine whether a crime has been
committed" and who committed it,21 that its "investigative power

must be broad, ' 22 - and that witnesses cannot interfere with its
inquiry. 2' The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter
future unlawful police activity and thus uphold the Fourth
Amendment

protection

against

unreasonable

searches

and

seizures.2 ' However, the rule is not applicable in all proceedings,
but is restricted to those where its purpose is most effectively
served - primarily, where a criminal sanction would be imposed on
the victim of the search.2 5

"Permitting witnesses to invoke the

exclusionary rule . . . would precipitate adjudication of issues...

reserved for trial on the merits and would delay and disrupt grand
jury proceedings.'

26

This damage to the function of the grand jury

was weighed against the deterrent effect on police misconduct and
the Court found that inadmissibility of illegally seized evidence in
a subsequent criminal trial negated any concerns.27 Concluding
that grand jury questions based on illegally seized evidence are a
derivative use of the fruits of a previous wrong and "work no new
.Fourth Amendment wrong,' 28 the Court held that the exclusionary
rule is inapplicable to a grand jury proceeding.
questioning based on the illegally seized evidence. Id. at 342. The Supreme

Court reversed. Id.
21
22
23

24

Id. at 343-44.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 345.

Id at 347.

Calandra,414 U.S. at 348.
Id. at 349.
27
Id. at 351.
25

26
28

Id. at 354.
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In United States v. Janis, the Court focused on the
application of the exclusionary rule to a federal civil tax
proceeding. 29 Evidence was seized in reliance on a warrant that
was later declared invalid. The Court found that "exclusion from
federal civil proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by a state
criminal enforcement officer has not been shown to have a
sufficient likelihood of deterring the conduct of the state police so
that it outweighs the societal costs imposed by the exclusion."3 In
its analysis, the Court stressed that it had never before applied the
exclusionary rule to either a state or federal civil proceeding."
Additionally, the Court noted that the rule is not a constitutional
right; rather, it was created as a remedy to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights.32

The Court found that "admission of the

evidence is unlikely to encourage violations of the Fourth
Amendment.

The admission of evidence in a federal civil

proceeding is simply not important enough to state criminal law
enforcement

officers to encourage

them to violate Fourth

29428 U.S. 433 (1976). State officers obtained a warrant to search defendant's
apartment on suspicion of illegal bookmaking operations. Id at 434. They
seized wagering records and approximately $5000 cash. Id. at 436. As a matter
of police procedure, the IRS was notified. Id. Based on the wagering records,
the IRS assessed taxes of some $89,000 and levied the seized cash as partial
satisfaction. Id. at 437. Once the search warrant was declared invalid, Janis
filed a claim for refund of the seized cash. Id. at 438. The district court found
When the government
Id. at 439.
she was entitled to her money.
counterclaimed for the balance of its assessment, the question devolved to the
issue of whether illegally obtained evidence may be used in formulating a tax
assessment that is the basis of a federal civil tax proceeding. Id

'Old. at 454.
a ld. at 447.
32 Id. at 446 (quoting Calandra,441 U.S. at 348).
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Amendment rights."33

"There comes a point at which courts,

consistent with their duty to administer the law, cannot continue to
create, barriers to law enforcement in the pursuit of a supervisory
role that is properly the duty of the Executive and Legislative
Branches."34 The Court held that the "exclusionary rule should not
be extended to forbid the use in the civil proceeding of one
sovereign of evidence seized by a criminal law enforcement agent
of another sovereign."35
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza further illustrates the Court's denial
of the exclusionary rule in administrative actions.36

Here, the

Court decided "whether an admission of unlawful presence in this
country made subsequent to an allegedly unlawful arrest must be
excluded as evidence in a civil deportation hearing."37 The Court
considered several factors in its analysis of whether the cost of
deterrence tipped in favor of applying the exclusionary rule. First,
a,deportation procedure is a civil matter that may be conducted in
the absence of the respondent.3" "The purpose of deportation is...
to put an end to a continuing violation of the immigration laws."3 9
33 Td

34

at:458.

Janis,.428 U.S. at 459.
35

1d at 460.
36468 U.S. 1032 (1984). Two Mexican citizens ordered deported by the INS
challenged the legality of their arrests. Id.at 1034. One also objected to the
admissibility of his admission of illegal entry. Id.The Ninth Circuit applied the
exclusionary rule to his case and vacated his deportation order.
Id.
Respondent's case was remanded to the INS Board of Appeals to determine
whether his admitted illegal entry, though not objected to as evidence at the
deportation hearing, would be admissible as the fruit of an unconstitutional
arrest. Id at 1034-35.
3TId.at
3
1Id at

1034.

39Id.
at

1039.

1038-39.
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The identity of a defendant can never be suppressed as the fruit of
an unlawful arrest."

Release of an unregistered alien subverts

public policy4 ' and deportation hearings are a streamlined efficient
procedure of implementing the law.4" Most importantly, "the INS
has

its

own

comprehensive

scheme

for deterring

Fourth

Amendment violations by its officers."43 The Court held that "the
exclusion of credible evidence gathered in connection with
peaceful arrests . . . need not be suppressed in an INS civil

deportation hearing.""
In Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott,45
the Court held the exclusionary rule did not apply.
completing

a

minimum

sentence

for third-degree

After
murder,

defendant Scott was released from prison.46 However, he "violated
several conditions of his parole by possessing firearms, consuming
alcohol, and assaulting a co-worker."47 Parole officers performed a
search of Scott's residence without requesting or obtaining
consent.48 The evidence obtained was introduced at Scott's parole
violation hearing and was challenged as an unreasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment. 49 The contest was rejected and the

40

id

Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1047.
1d. at 1049.
41 d. at 1044.
"Id. at 1051.
45 524 U.S. 357 (1998).
46
ld. at 359-60.
41

42

47
48

Id at 360.

Id A warrantless search was conducted pursuant to Gordon's parole

agreement.
Id.
49
Id. at 360.
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Consequently, Scott's parole was revoked

and he was reincarcerated

1

The lower "court ruled that the search

violated respondent's Fourth Amendment rights because it was
conducted without the owner's consent and was not authorized by
any

state

statutory or regulatory

framework ensuring

reasonableness of searches by parole officers.

52

the

Additionally, the

court found that deterrence benefits derived from the exclusionary
rule overcame its costsi

3

The ruling in this case was affirmed by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court as an exception to its bar against application of the
exclusionary rule in parole revocation hearings. 4

The court

reasoned that the bar invited flagrant illegal conduct on the part of
parole officers aware of an individual's parole status. 5
petitioned

the

Supreme

Court

to

determine

whether

Scott
the

exclusionary rule applied to parole revocation proceedings. 6
Initially, the Court said "that the government's use of
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment does not
itself violate the Constitution."57

Referring to its decision in

58 the Court deemed the exclusionary rule to be a judicial
Calandra,

remedy invoked when its deterrence benefits outweigh its social
Scott, 524 U.S. at 360.

50

5' Id. at 360-61.
52 Id. at 361.
51(.

54 Id. at 36 1
55 Scott, 524 U.S. at 362.
56

57

id.

1 d. at 362.

Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354 (holding , in a grand jury proceeding, the
exclusionary rule is not a bar to questioning based on illegally seized evidence).
58
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costs. 9 Therefore, the Court has "repeatedly declined to extend the
exclusionary rule to proceedings other than criminal trials.

60

Thus, the exclusionary rule does not apply to grand jury
civil

proceedings,
proceedings. 6

tax

proceedings,

and

civil

deportation

In Scott, the Court again declined to "extend the

operation of the exclusionary rule beyond the criminal trial
context."62

Seeing only minimal deterrence benefits regarding

parole revocations since the rule already bars unconstitutional
searches in the criminal trial context, the Court held "that the
federal exclusionary rule does not bar the introduction at parole
revocation hearings of evidence seized in violation of parolees'
Fourth Amendment rights.

63

The Court reasoned that a rule

precluding consideration of highly reliable probative evidence
would allow those who have already been regarded as lawbreakers
to escape the consequences of their further unlawful actions. 64 The
costs to law enforcement and the truth-finding process would then
be exceedingly high as compared to the benefits of deterring illegal
behavior on the part of law enforcement officials.65
In reaching its conclusion, the Court saw parolees as
convicted criminals accorded a limited measure of freedom,
conditioned upon adherence to the state's strict terms of release.66
59 Scott, 524

U.S. at 363.

60 id.
61 id

62

Id.at 364.

63 id.

64
65 Scott, 524 U.S.at 364.
Id.at 364-65.
66 ld. at 365.
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Thus, the state has a strong interest in ensuring that a parolee,
aware that noncompliance will result in a return to prison,
complies with the conditions of his release.67 If this conditional
liberty is abused, the state should not be hampered from offering
evidence of a violation.6" Additionally, parole revocation hearings
are traditionally informal, flexible administrative proceedings69
designed to be "predictive and discretionary"7 where there is no
right to counsel. 7 Permitting the exclusionary rule would change
the nature of these nonadversarial administrative proceedings.72
Looking at the deterrence benefits, the Court determined
that an officer unaware of a subject's parole status would hardly
seek to disregard Fourth Amendment dictates and disrupt his
primary goal of obtaining a conviction.73 The same holds true for
police officers aware of their subject's status.74 Parole officers are
involved in a supervisory relationship and concerned primarily
with the question of whether their parolees should remain free.75
However, they are also aware that illegally obtained evidence
would be challenged as inadmissible in a criminal trial.76 It is
unlikely they would seek purposefully to engage in such

67 id.
68

id.

Scott, 524 U.S.at 364, 366.
Id at 366. 367.
71Id. at 366.
69
70

72 id.
71Id. at 367.
71 Scott, 524

75 Id.
76

1d. at

U.S. at 368.

369.
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detrimental conduct." Balancing these countervailing interests, the
Court concluded, "parole boards are not required by federal law to
exclude

evidence

obtained

in

violation

of

the

Fourth

Amendment."78
New York jurisprudence long held to the proscription of
admitting illegally seized evidence at parole revocation hearings.
Distinctions between the administrative proceeding of parole
revocation and a criminal action were believed to undermine the
deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. The state could not be
seen as committing a crime to secure a criminal conviction.
79
People ex rel. Piccarillo v. New York State Board of Parole

examined the right to revoke parole founded upon illegally
obtained evidence.

The Court of Appeals in this instance

determined that the exclusionary rule does apply to parole
revocation hearings.8 " It perceived its task as defining the nature of
the parole revocation proceeding.8 Parole revocation hearings are
administrative

proceedings

with

serious

consequences.

Specifically, parole revocation is just as much a deprivation of
liberty as is a conviction in a criminal action.82 The exclusionary
rule provides incentive for law enforcement personnel to remain
within constitutional limitations, whether obtaining evidence for a

7Id.at 368-69.
Id at 369.
79397 N.E.2d 354 (N.Y. 1979).
80
Id.at 358.
81
1d at 356.
82
78

id.
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Parolees do "not

relinquish all constitutionally guaranteed rights"84 even though
they are "legally in custody and subject to supervision. 8 5 Freedom

"from unreasonable search and seizures, guaranteed by both
Federal and State Constitutions . . . remains inviolate. 86

Yet

parole boards have a pressing need to consider all relevant
evidence when deciding a parolee's status.8 7

However, illegal

official activity when condoned in an administrative proceeding
would undermine deterrence in any realm. 8
Other cases concerning the exclusionary rule depended
solely upon federal law in their interpretation. Finn's Liquor Shop
v. State Liquor Authority held that the exclusionary rule applied to
hearings before the State Liquor Authority.

9

Stating that the

function of the rule is to compel respect for Fourth Amendment
guarantees,9" the Court of Appeals of New York saw no distinction
in the admissibility of evidence between

a liquor license

suspension/bond forfeiture and criminal proceeding.9
agencies must conduct their investigative

State

and enforcement

activities within the confines of the Fourth Amendment if the
exclusionary
83

rule

is to be

effective

in deterring

official

Id at 357 (quoting Finn's Liquor Shop v. State Liquor Auth., 249 N.E.2d

440, 442 (N.Y. 1969)).
84 Piccarillo, 397 N.E.2d
at 357.
86

Id. See i

87

Id. at 358.

88

CONST. amend. IV; N.Y. CONST. art. 1,§ 12.

id.

89

249 N.E.2d 440 (N.Y. 1969).

90

Id.at 442.

91Id
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misconduct.92 Therefore, evidence obtained illegally, in violation
of the Fourth Amendment, cannot be used to support the authority
of a state agency.
People v. McGrath93 illustrates New York's dependence
upon the federal interpretation of the exclusionary rule. Relying
upon United States Supreme Court rulings in Mapp v. Ohio94 and
Calandra, the New York Court of Appeals allowed evidence
obtained from an illegal wiretap to form the basis of grand jury
testimony and a subsequent criminal contempt finding. Holding
that the wiretap violated state law, the court still "refused to
suppress the defendant's testimony given in response to questions
based upon information derived through the wiretap, viewing the
defendant's testimony as an independent act calculated to obstruct
the investigation of the murder conspiracy conducted by the Grand
Jury, rather than as fruit of the illegal surveillance."95

In the

consolidated case, which also dealt with an illegal wiretap, two
police officers were charged with perjury before a grand jury and
were suspended from duty.'

In both cases, the information

obtained through the wiretaps, and their fruits in the form of
testimony, was deemed admissible before the grand jury.97
Whether the evidence was admissible in the civil contempt
92 Id.at 442, 442-43.

" 385 N.E.2d 541 (N.Y. 1978).
14 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained in a search and seizure
violative of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in both state and federal
courts).
9'
96 McGrath, 385 N.E.2d at 545.
Id. at 546.
97

d. at 547.
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proceeding and the civil disciplinary proceeding depended upon
whether the taint of the original unlawful conduct extended to an
intervening event.98 The court held that the Grand Jury testimony
was sufficiently independent of the prohibited police conduct and
rejected the contention that the illegal wiretap could be a defense
to criminal contempt. 9

The "intervening willful act of perjury,

together with the insubstantial benefit to be gained at the expense
of the truth-finding process by application of the exclusionary rule
militates against suppression of

.

. live testimony.""

The

decision was based solely on federal constitutional law.
Given this difference between the United States Supreme
Court decision of Scott and the New York Court of Appeals
judgment in Piccarillo, as well as the lack of a separate state
constitutional ruling, the Gordon court chose to follow Scott. The
court in Gordon relied on the 1938 Constitutional Convention's
refusal to adopt an exclusionary rule for Art. I, Section 6
violations'' and "found no case in which the Court of Appeals
referred to Picarillo as involving an interpretation of the State
Constitution broader than its federal counterpart."'0 2 Rather, as the
exclusive policy making body of the New York judiciary, the court
has addressed the exclusionary rule solely in a federal context.0 3
"Accordingly, the Supreme Court's decision in Scott is held to

98

Id at 548.
99 Id. at 548-49.
'0o
McGrath, 385 N.E.2d at 551.
I0' Gordon, 775 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
102Id.at 513.
103 Id
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abrogate Picarillo, and the court finds that no separate state
constitutional rule has been created which calls for application of
the exclusionary rule to parole revocation proceedings."'' "

Thus,

there is no difference between federal and state application of the
exclusionary rule to parole revocation hearings.
In conclusion, the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section

12 of the New York

Constitution afford the same protection against illegal search and
seizures in a criminal action.

However, the exclusionary rule

afforded to defendants in a criminal trial context is unavailable in a
parole revocation proceeding under both the federal and state
constitutions. Differences occur only in determining the validity of
a search and seizure. In Gordon, New York statutory regulations
regarding pursuit and flight" 5 led to suppression of evidence in the
criminal prosecution with respect to a parole violation, but did not
exclude the same evidence from admission to a parole revocation
hearing. In fact, the court ruled that the evidence was admissible,
regardless of the means employed in obtaining it. Concerns of
protecting the privacy interests of parolees via the exclusionary
rule are far outweighed by social policy concerning the lack of
consequences for conduct by individuals more likely to engage in
crime and the need to protect the public.
HannahAbrams
104

id.

105

Id. at 510. See People v. Howard, 408 N.E.2d 908 (N.Y. 1980) (holding

that pursuit absent probable cause constitutes a limited detention, violating the
federal and state constitutions).
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